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A B S T R A C T
This paper applies property rights theory to explain changes in foreign afﬁliates’ ownership. Post-entry
ownership change is driven by both ﬁrm-level characteristics and by the differences in the institutional
environments in host countries. We distinguish between ﬁnancial market development and the level of
corruption as two different institutional dimensions, such that changes along these dimensions impact
upon ownership change in different ways. Furthermore, we argue that changes in ownership are affected
by the foreign afﬁliate’s relatedness with its parent’s sector, as well as by the afﬁliate’s maturity. We use
ﬁrm level data across 125 host countries to test our hypotheses.
ã 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of World Business
journal home page : www.elsevier .com/ locat e/ jwb1. Introduction
Firm ownership remains a core construct in the international
business (IB) literature (Aguilera & Crespi-Cladera, 2016). The need
to retain ownership and control of ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets is at the core
of internalisation theory and is a founding pillar of the dominant
paradigms in IB. Indeed, as discussed in the recent retrospective by
Brouthers (2013), the large literature on entry modes has explored
ownership decisions at the point of entry, particularly with the aid
of transaction cost theory. However, there is limited understanding
of how multinational enterprises (MNE) and local partners adjust
their ownership shares as the external environment changes.
The existing theory on ownership change builds primarily on
the tradition of Johanson and Vahlne (1977, 2009) who emphasise
experiential learning and the evolutionary aspects of the process of
ownership structure adjustment. However, the existing literature
treats the evolution of foreign presence in a location as being,
ceteris paribus, an incremental process of increased commitment.
Accordingly, many studies adopt a theoretical framework that is in
line with the Uppsala model (see e.g., Brouthers & Bamossy, 1997;
and Globerman & Shapiro, 2003), which argues that ﬁrms
internationalise incrementally based on their ability to* Corresponding author.
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markets. However, to use this argument in order to explore the
nature of the relationship between experience and afﬁliate
ownership is, as Birkinshaw and Morrison (1995) point out,
misleading. Rather, it is important to emphasise that the process of
ownership change is driven by a variety of factors, resulting in an
increase or a decrease in shares held by the foreign investor over
time. Importantly, these follow not only the foreign investor’s
strategy but are co-determined by the local partner’s incentives
and motivation in holding the remainder of the afﬁliates’
ownership shares. We incorporate this aspect into the analysis
in order to consider the relative value of both the foreign and the
local partner’s contributions at the afﬁliate level. We argue that the
evolution of the relative value of these contributions varies not
only due to ﬁrm-level features and processes (relatedness of
afﬁliate to parent and maturity of the afﬁliate), but also due to the
institutional environments. Our study, therefore, contributes to the
literature on internationalisation and ownership change in several
ways.
First, we conceptualise post-entry changes in foreign afﬁliate
ownership with the aid of property rights theory. Indeed, we seek
to develop this literature in line with the ﬁndings of Beamish and
Lupton (2016) who argue that it is important for future theory
building on cooperative strategies in IB to focus research “on what
is best for the agreement, or joint venture (JV), rather than what is
good for either the foreign or local partner” (Beamish & Luptonder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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existing literature, views ownership structures only from the
perspective of the foreign partner (i.e. parent MNE), while the local
partner (i.e. host country partner) is equally important. It is
necessary therefore to expand our conceptual understanding. We
posit that the property rights theory is a perspective that ﬁts this
suggested purpose, and we use this theory to conceptualise post-
entry changes in foreign afﬁliate ownership. This allows us to
develop arguments to extend the traditional analysis centred on
transaction costs (Brouthers, 2002) in order to consider the
optimal distribution of ownership shares, emphasising effective
responses to the problem of incomplete control. We use insights
gleaned from property rights theory to investigate ﬁrm level and
country level drivers of changes in ownership structure. In doing
so, we explore the applicability of the property rights theory to the
core IB theme of ﬁrm ownership (Antràs, 2014). Our main
argument is that changes along the institutional dimensions and
to the ﬁrm-level characteristics affect the relative value of the local
and foreign partners’ contributions and their outside options (e.g.
sources of ﬁnance) in a non-symmetric manner.
Second, we extend the literature, building on Hoskisson et al.
(2013), by contrasting the changes in the general quality of host
country institutions that affect contracting opportunities, with the
impact of improved ﬁnancial markets in the host countries. We
posit that ﬁnancial market development is a distinct factor in
explaining ownership change. In many emerging market econo-
mies, the quality of the ﬁnancial sub-systems may exceed the
overall institutional quality (Glaeser, Johnson, & Shleifer, 2001) and
the two systems may well evolve independently of each other. This
links with arguments of Cantwell, Dunning, and Lundan (2010),
who explore the co-evolution of institutions and inward investors.
Third, by focusing on changes in ownership structure, we can
better isolate institutional effects from static country character-
istics. For example, institutional quality measures, when captured
in levels are strongly correlated with level of development, as
documented by institutional theorists (e.g., North, 1990). This
confounding effect no longer applies to changes in institutions.
Likewise, the dynamic approach enables us to incorporate the
impact of the increasing maturity of the foreign afﬁliate, and also
how outcomes of these processes differ for ﬁrms that are
characterised by higher relatedness, building on the concept
utilised by Malhotra and Gaur (2014).
We have annual observations of ownership shares for 53,625
foreign afﬁliates in 125 countries in our sample period of 2002–
2012, whereas previous studies have mostly relied on information
at the time of investment. Utilising this data, we test our
hypotheses relying on the multinomial logit estimator. Our core
ﬁndings, in contrast with the earlier literature, are that an increase
in corruption in the host country results in a lower likelihood of a
multinational reducing its holding to become a minority partner. In
contrast, improvements in local capital markets make such a move
more likely, as it enhances access to ﬁnance for local ﬁrms. At the
micro-level, we ﬁnd that maturity of ﬁrms makes an adjustment
towards minority foreign control more likely and higher related-
ness between the afﬁliate’s and the parent’s activities makes an
adjustment towards minority foreign control less likely. Our
results are detailed below and explained with the aid of property
right theory.
The paper is organised as follows. We ﬁrst discuss the
theoretical framework and derive our hypotheses. In the subse-
quent section we describe the data and methodology. The ﬁnal
sections present and discuss the results, followed by concluding
remarks.2. Property rights theory and ownership structures
Property rights theory (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart, 1995)
shares its essential premise with transaction cost theory (Wil-
liamson, 1985) in emphasising that contracts are always incom-
plete. This places the focus on ownership, since rights to income
streams may not always be protected by arms’ length contractual
arrangements. The distribution of ownership rights becomes
crucial in the presence of incomplete contracts and where
investments by partners are observable but not veriﬁable (Hart,
1995, pp. 29 and 36). Property rights theory stresses that it is
optimal for ownership control to rest with those who have the
greatest impact on the value of the venture and whose output is
most difﬁcult to measure and verify (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992, p.
311). In addition, the partners’ contributions to value added need
to be considered in conjunction with their outside options (De
Meza & Lockwood,1998). These factors determine the nature of the
control that partners exert over an investment, which follows from
ownership patterns. This is explored empirically by Drifﬁeld et al.
(2014), but we seek to build on this, developing arguments from
Aghion and Holden (2011); Grossman and Hart (1986); Hart
(1995). Despite their obvious appeal, applications of property
rights theory to internationalisation issues are scarce and are
either of theoretical character (Antràs, 2005, 2014) or relate to
single country empirical studies (Feenstra & Hanson, 2005).1
Building on Carson and John (2013), we argue that the problem
of efﬁcient allocation of control rights within afﬁliates or JVs is
analogous to the problem of control rights between a MNE and a
local ﬁrm in the context of outsourcing. Furthermore, consistent
with Drifﬁeld et al. (2014), the optimisation of ownership structure
of afﬁliates or JVs can be analytically separated into two different
parts: (i) that of control rights which typically come with majority
control (see: Gaur & Lu, 2007), which is the property rights
question, and (ii) that of speciﬁc percentages assigned to partners
once the majority ownership issue is resolved – which may be seen
more as an agency theory question. This distinction is consistent
with the empirical evidence in two ways. First, the issue of majority
control is often most contentious in JVs and mergers and
acquisitions. Second, the distribution of ownership shares is
non-normal, with peaks on either side of 50% (for further
discussion see Drifﬁeld, Mickiewicz, & Temouri, 2014). This
indicates, as one would expect, that the majority/minority
distinction is critical from a theoretical as well as an empirical
perspective. Although ownership is reported as a continuum, there
is great signiﬁcance attached to certain percentages, particularly
around the majority ownership threshold (Bishop, Filatotchev, &
Mickiewicz, 2002).
At the same time, according to property rights theory, the
allocation of control rights should follow the relative capacity of
the respective partners to positively inﬂuence the value of the
venture at the margin. Yet evaluating these impacts remains
difﬁcult, even where the foreign partner’s contribution is generally
accepted to be more signiﬁcant. Antràs (2005) illustrates this point
using examples from sectors where product development or
international marketing are core to the business and central to the
development and ampliﬁcation of ﬁrm speciﬁc assets. Yet even in
these sectors, the contribution of the local partner remains
signiﬁcant, particularly when driven by local knowledge and
resources (Feenstra & Hanson, 2005).1 In particular, we follow Antràs (2014), who discusses in detail the application of
Grossman and Hart (1986) to the analysis of international trade and the
coordination of global value chains.
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Property rights theory emphasises the transactions-relevant
attributes of business partners, which need to be seen in the
context of outside options. Outside options are in turn shaped by
the institutional environment (De Meza & Lockwood,1998). Carson
and John (2013) note that there is potentially a wide range of
unexplored issues within IB related to the role of institutions, to
which property rights theory may be applied.
Institutional quality and its relationship to both IB theory and
practice is a prime example of this. Institutional quality in a given
country may impact on foreign and local ﬁrms differently, both in
terms of its importance, and the dimensions of the impact. The
framework of Cuervo-Cazzura and Dau (2009) or Dau and Cuervo-
Cazurra (2014) highlights how improvements in various aspects of
institutional quality can be expected to have heterogeneous effects
at the ﬁrm level. For example, improvements in capital markets
disproportionately beneﬁt local ﬁrms, who are mostly tied to their
local markets. Conversely, foreign ﬁrms with less knowledge of the
host country’s informal institutions will be beneﬁting dispropor-
tionately less from their improvements.
The central tenet of our argument is that effective institutions
protect property rights and facilitate contract enforcement,
imposing penalties on corruption and reducing transactions costs.
However, while Brouthers (2002, 2013) has explored how different
ownership structures develop in response to different transaction
costs associated with various aspects of institutional quality,
building for example on Khanna and Palepu (2010) and Eden and
Miller (2004), we seek to develop this further. Peng and Heath
(1996) argue that within a strategic choice setting, adjustment in
ownership structure follows the actual or perceived changes in
prevailing institutional environments. We seek to coalesce these
arguments using property rights theory.
Hoskisson et al. (2013) highlight the juxtaposition of two
elements of the institutional environment in emerging markets;
namely the risks associated with low levels of property rights
protection and the ﬁnancial risk associated with thin or poorly
developed ﬁnancial markets. Applying this to ownership decisions
amid institutional changes, our main argument is that the
developments along these two dimensions do not need to be
strongly correlated (Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Huizinga, 2001;
Drifﬁeld et al., 2014). We argue and demonstrate in our analysis
that improvements in institutional quality and in the ﬁnancial
markets need to be viewed as two separate dimensions. This is
similar to Peng, Lee, and Wang (2005), who contrast the broader
institutional features which affect product markets with the more
speciﬁc institutional features related to ﬁnancial markets. Both
may, from the perspective of foreign investors and local partners,
produce different outcomes (Khoury & Peng, 2011; Makhija &
Stewart, 2002). Likewise, Cantwell et al. (2010) explore the
evolution of both ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial institutions alongside
the evolution of foreign afﬁliates’ strategies.
2.2. Institutional and ﬁnancial market drivers of change in ownership
control
Let us ﬁrst consider a possible transaction costs argument
related to institutional quality as proxied by corruption. What
happens when institutional quality deteriorates so that the level of
corruption increases? To paraphrase Leo Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina:
transparent institutional environments are all alike, while every
corrupt environment is corrupt in its own way. In other words,
efﬁcient institutions imply transparent and universal rules, while
inefﬁcient ones imply localised knowledge and relationships. Thus,as corruption increases, the environment becomes more opaque to
the foreign investor.
Transactions costs approach, or related agency approach to this
problem would emphasise the increased risk of opportunistic
behaviour by the local partner, with increased transaction costs
incurred by the foreign partner. Local partners have a better
understanding of local conditions, and this gives them additional
advantage in such relationships if institutions weaken. As
institutional quality and the transparency of business dealings
decline, monitoring the local partner’s behaviour becomes more
problematic, and this is more likely to lead to a transfer of
resources out of the venture by the local partner (Kogut 1988). An
organisational solution to this is to give higher shares to local
partner. To put it differently, a reduction in local partner’s share
becomes less likely (Meyer, Mudambi, & Narula, 2011), because
higher shares of the local partner implies that the incentives for
opportunistic behaviour diminish. This is an argument, which can
be seen as combining the transaction costs and the agency theory
perspectives (see also: Drifﬁeld et al., 2014).
In contrast, we may construct the property rights argument as
related to the risk of both partners being expropriated by the
government or its agents; the risk which increases when the
institutional quality deteriorates. Historical evidence for this may
be derived, for example, by focusing on the early period of
liberalisation in China, when the institutional protection of
domestic private property was still negligible. We are interested
in which way the ownership of ﬁrms may adjust to such
conditions. In that period, foreign dominant ownership was
actively sought after by local partners, and one of the reasons
was that the presence of a foreign partner guaranteed security of
ownership: “private entrepreneurs might have desired FDI
arrangements as a way to protect their assets” (Huang, 2003:
201). Acquiring a foreign partner alleviated not only the risk of
outright expropriation but also of tunnelling value from the
company and its private shareholders to state shareholders or
stakeholders, as again exempliﬁed by Huang (2003). At that time,
the only alternatives were by way of informal investment or by
hiding private ventures in disguised forms of state ownership.
Property rights theory can be used to generalise this as follows.
In environments that are characterised by low institutional quality,
it is the foreign partner that may be better protected from
expropriation risks. Foreign partners may be in a stronger position
than their local partners due to wider reputational effects of
explicit or implicit expropriation (Drifﬁeld, Mickiewicz, & Temouri,
2013). While under corrupt governments such expropriation is
possible, it may be less likely when the foreign partner has high
ownership stake in the foreign afﬁliate.
In summary, the question becomes whether property rights or
transaction costs – agency arguments dominate in the explanation
of changes in ownership structure triggered by change in
corruption levels. According to transaction cost/agency theory,
foreign partner ﬁrms would respond to deteriorating institutional
quality and increased opaqueness in a host country by reducing
their ownership share and increasing the share of the host country
ﬁrm in order to incentivise the local partner to act in the best
interest of the ﬁrm. In contrast, property rights theory emphasises
the relative contributions of the two parties, and in this case the
increased contribution of the foreign partner, through the greater
security attached to foreign ownership. For example, foreign
investors are backed by their home country governments, and in
the case of countries characterised by instability, by investment
treaties between governments to prevent expropriation. Therefore,
as institutional quality declines, the relative importance of the
foreign partner increases. This leads us to propose our ﬁrst
hypothesis as a set of two alternatives:
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majority to minority foreign ownership becomes more likely
(costs of opacity argument).
H1b. As corruption in the host country worsens, the shift from
majority to minority foreign ownership becomes less likely
(risks of expropriation argument).
Any adjustment in ownership structure presumes a functioning
ﬁnancial market, such that equity in the afﬁliate can be traded.
Thus, the cost of adjustment related to ﬁnancial markets may
become a critical factor. Baker, Foley, & Wurgler, 2008, for example,
show a model of the MNE acting as a capital arbitrageur, raising
ﬁnance in markets where capital is cheap or where equity can be
sold at a premium, and then transferring that capital to locations
where local capital is expensive and the expected returns
considerably higher. If ease of adjustment is the critical factor,
we would expect that both downward and upward adjustment in
ownership shares of foreign owner becomes more likely.
Financial market development may have additional signiﬁ-
cance. With weak ﬁnancial markets, the corporate governance
challenges faced by emerging market ﬁrms are well documented
(Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev, & Peng, 2013). Here, as well as
providing ﬁnance, a key contribution of foreign investors may be to
signal the governance quality so that external ﬁnance may be
acquired at lower cost. This extends the analysis of emerging
market ﬁrms of Khanna and Palepu (1999), based on the signalling
approach of Peng and Su (2014). Consistent with this, the
contribution of the foreign ﬁrm, both in terms of the direct
provision of capital, but also of signalling and monitoring, may be a
key determinant of the prevailing ownership structure, affecting
the allocation of property rights where ﬁnancial markets are weak.
However, with property rights theory and the literature which
develops from it, it is also important to take into account the
outside options in order to appropriately incentivise partners (De
Meza and Lockwood, 1998). For example, Huang (2003) makes a
strong argument by demonstrating that the initial ﬂow of FDI to
China was, to a large extent, the result of private domestic ﬁrms in
that country not being able to secure ﬁnancing and working capital
for their operations. Following this logic, we expect that in
environments where local ﬁnancing opportunities for local private
companies improve, those ventures, initially dominated by foreign
partners, will experience an evolution in ownership, with local
equity either replacing or diluting foreign equity.
This suggests that as the local ﬁnancial market develops, the
importance of foreign investors declines in the sense that local
partners are less in need of ﬁnance from the foreign partner as well
as in need of signalling governance quality. In turn, this reduces the
relative value of the foreign partner’s contribution. Therefore,
building on the analysis of Henisz (2000), we argue that local
ﬁnancial development is disproportionately more beneﬁcial to the
local partner. MNEs can by deﬁnition access ﬁnancial markets at
home and abroad, while local ﬁrms are typically limited to their
own ﬁnancial markets. Moreover, ﬁnancial markets not only
provide access to ﬁnance but also help to efﬁciently allocate
resources by providing screening and monitoring of investment
decisions. As Claessens et al. (2001) discuss in their seminal work
on governance in emerging markets, the better the local ﬁnancial
markets work, the better the outside evaluation and ﬁnancial
market responses to investment projects. Again, this implies that
the importance of the signalling effect of foreign partner’s presence
diminishes.
Property rights analysis therefore suggests that as local
ﬁnancial markets improve, the marginal distinct contribution of
the foreign partner, not only in terms of providing capital but alsowith regard to monitoring and signalling, declines. This leads to
our second hypothesis:
H2. As equity markets in the host country improve, the shift
from majority to minority foreign ownership becomes more
likely.
2.3. Firm-level drivers of change in ownership control
We now explore the importance of maturity of the joint project
in the context of the ownership structure. We contrast the
perspective we derive from property rights theory with one of the
dominant perspectives in IB, namely the Uppsala model (Johanson
& Vahlne, 1977, 2009). The latter would lead to the conclusion that
foreign investor’s commitment increases over time as the foreign
partner gains experience and the afﬁliate becomes more embed-
ded.
However, reﬂecting on control patterns and strategies of
subsidiaries, Ambos, Andersson, and Birkinshaw (2010), Birkin-
shaw and Morrison (1995), and Nobel and Birkinshaw (1998) argue
that experience better informs strategy, but that informed strategy
is neither equivalent to the continuation of the status quo, nor to
any form of a linear evolution towards more control by the parent
company. Their arguments can be extended to explore changes in
ownership structure. In this context, we highlight the importance
of experience of both parties in explaining prevailing ownership
structure, in terms of the incremental, but not necessary
unidirectional, adjustment towards the optimal solution. This
may involve adjustments in either direction from the initial
ownership agreement. In order to consider this question using
property rights theory, we build on the existing literature which
considers the ownership structure, in terms of the respective
bargaining positions of the two parties (Drifﬁeld et al., 2014). This
emphasises that the key contributions of the foreign partner is
typically capital, technology, and international marketing, while
the key contribution of the local partner is local knowledge.
These respective contributions are crucial to the venture. In
particular, knowledge transfer by foreign ﬁrms into a host country
follows particular patterns, depending on the life cycle of the
products concerned. This may involve for example a large initial
investment, which declines over time, or a low investment that
increases as the ﬁrm understands more about the host environ-
ment. Such an investment relates mainly to technology and may be
embedded in sophisticated product design (e.g. Buckley & Casson,
2010; Drifﬁeld, Love, & Menghinello, 2010). It may also include
managerial and organisational knowledge and marketing; yet, as
the foreign afﬁliate matures, both become absorbed and embedded
within it (Antràs, 2005). Irrespective of the technological
development path of the afﬁliate, as a project matures, the
technology it employs is likely to become more standardised and
adapted to local conditions (Fang, Wade, Delios, & Beamish, 2013);
it is also better understood locally and, crucially, is less cutting
edge. In turn, this requires lower levels of international technology
transfer from the foreign parent. Consistent with property rights
theory, controlling ownership by the foreign partner becomes less
likely.
We therefore argue that the property rights approach may help
us to understand the link between the maturity of the project and
the evolution of ownership structures. This nuances the predic-
tions based on the standard approaches adopted in IB developed
from Johanson and Vahlne (1977), highlighting that typical
changes in the respective contributions of the two parties over
time makes the foreign partner less likely to retain a controlling
stake.
Consider for example the situation where the foreign ﬁrm starts
out as the majority partner. The scenario here is similar to Gans
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interim bargaining, as the relative contributions of the two parties
change. In our context it reﬂects the investment patterns of both
parties, and their changing contributions (e.g., Leahy & Montanga,
2015). Consistent with the argument we presented above, and
building on the analysis of Boddewyn (1983), we focus on the value
of the corresponding contribution, and therefore the value of
controlling ownership: the latter declines with respect to the
foreign partner. Maturity increases the relative weight of the
contribution of the local partner, as local factors may now
dominate foreign (standardised) technology. The knowledge of
the local partners becomes more important, and with it the value
of their contribution. This ceteris paribus triggers the downward
adjustment of the foreign share in the existing equity structure.
To conclude, we contrast the arguments supporting gradual
increase of foreign partner commitment with those supporting the
decrease of relative signiﬁcance of foreign partner contribution.
This leads to our third hypothesis presented as two alternatives:
H3a. The more mature the local afﬁliate, the more likely it is that
there will be is a shift from minority to majority foreign
ownership (Uppsala model perspective).
H3b. The more mature the local afﬁliate, the more likely it is that
there will be is a shift from majority to minority foreign
ownership (property rights theory perspective).
Our ﬁnal hypothesis extends our analysis from experience to
consider relatedness, i.e. whether the parent ﬁrm and the host
country ﬁrm operate in the same core industry. Relatedness in this
context is widely seen as an important construct (see e.g. Malhotra
& Gaur, 2014). We focus our attention on the impact of relatedness
of the foreign afﬁliate on the evolution of ownership over time.
Andersson et al. (2005) maintain that sharing the same industry
makes it more likely that knowledge transfer will occur, in both
directions (Andersson, Forsgren, & Holm, 2007; Drifﬁeld et al.,
2010; Mudambi & Navarra, 2004). Arguably, ﬁrms develop
strategies to mitigate risks in such investments from the start,
and establish stable ownership structures that best address the
trade-off between risk and opportunism (Zhou, 2014). One could
therefore assume that this inﬂuences not only the initial
ownership structure, but also the likelihood of changes in that
structure as the relationship develops, making a change in a ﬁrm’s
holdings less likely. It follows from this argument that such
investments that are characterised by relatedness are less likely to
be subject to post-establishment ownership control change.
However, property rights theory enables us to come with
sharper predictions. Again, we argue that the key factor is the
relative contribution of the respective partners in a JV. We posit
that greater relatedness between the parent and the speciﬁc host
country JV ampliﬁes and sustains over time the marginal value of
the foreign partner’s contribution.2 Where a foreign afﬁliate is part
of the parent MNE’s core activity, this is related to higher levels of
particularly valuable technology transfer (Drifﬁeld et al., 2010;
Drifﬁeld, Love, & Yang, 2016). This in turn increases the value of the
parent’s contribution, implying a larger ownership share, and also
makes it more likely that this share will be sustained over time.
Thus, we argue that higher levels of relatedness lead to higher
sustained ownership by the foreign partner. Therefore, within the2 We note an important, alternative line of reasoning by Malhotra and Gaur
(2014) who observe that “the relatedness of the acquirer and the target affects
information asymmetry and the associate risks that acquirers faces” (Ibid., p.197). It
follows therefore that the higher relatedness implies lower moral hazard risks due
to the investor’s superior knowledge of the acquired ﬁrm’s proﬁle, which may also
lead to higher stakes, albeit for different reasons that we emphasise.realms of possible adjustments, it is the downwards adjustment
that is particularly less likely to occur. This leads to our ﬁnal
hypothesis:
H4. Parents and their afﬁliates with high relatedness exhibit a
lower likelihood of changing from majority to minority foreign
ownership.
3. Data and methodology
Our data sample includes 122 home countries and 125 host
countries. It is drawn from ORBIS, which is a comprehensive, rich,
ﬁrm-level dataset. It is provided by Bureau van Dijk (BvD),3 a
leading electronic publisher of annual account information on
private and public ﬁrms around the world. The data provides
information on the afﬁliates of a given company, together with the
ownership structure. It is collected from various sources, including
national ofﬁcial bodies in charge of gathering company accounts
data. The data are then compiled and organised by BvD in a
consistent format, following strict guidelines, making it compara-
ble across countries. We have the timing of the investment
decision given by the date of incorporation of the venture and we
trace changes in ownership and the investment in foreign and
domestic capital throughout the period.4
The average foreign ownership of afﬁliates is relatively high at
75% and we observe a change in ownership in 58% of all afﬁliates.
This change in ownership could be a few percentage points, or
something more signiﬁcant up to and including a move to wholly
owned status or reduction to zero (i.e. exit). The average
adjustment in shares is 30%. This information clearly indicates
that adjusting ownership after entry can be seen as a relatively
common business practice (Benito, Petersen, & Welch, 2009). More
importantly for our analysis, 8% of the sample accounts for
afﬁliates that switch from minority to majority ownership or vice
versa.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics regarding the coverage of
our data and the differences in institutional quality. As one would
expect, there are signiﬁcant differences between the highest and
lowest values of institutional quality across countries, providing a
good deal of spread in terms of both the home and the host country
values.
Fig.1 shows a scatter across countries along the two dimensions
of institutional quality. It shows the average annual change over
the period 2002–2013 in both the ease of access to ﬁnancial
markets and in the corruption index (please see Section 3.1 below
for exact deﬁnitions of these variables). Importantly for our
econometric design, Fig.1 shows little correlation between the two
dimensions (R squared is 4.2%), conﬁrming the argument we
identify above: ﬁnancial markets may be seen as an autonomous
part of the institutional environment, evolving in a relatively
independent way from overall institutional quality. Presenting
over 100 countries would clutter the diagram, especially in the
centre, so we show the largest twenty economies plus outliers, i.e.
countries located furthest from the centre of the graph on either
one or both dimensions where institutional environment change
was most pronounced.
For example, China, Qatar, Uruguay and Ecuador are countries
where both the effectiveness of their equity markets improved and
the level of corruption diminished. Zimbabwe and Malawi
represent the case of some progress in ﬁghting corruption coupled
with a weakening of local equity markets. In two Latin American3 ORBIS is available via the provider’s website at www.bvdep.com.
4 We are able to trace ownership throughout the period by using earlier releases
or archived information of the dataset for each ﬁrm.
Table 1
The Geographical distribution of ﬁrms in the sample, 2002–2013.
Country Parent ﬁrms Afﬁliates Corruption index Equity market index
Mean (s.d.) Mean (s.d.)
OECD Europe 30,279 18,247 3.05 (1.16) 4.65 (1.03)
OECD North America 2040 765 2.51 (0.50) 5.35 (0.69)
OECD Asia 1005 616 3.80 (0.68) 5.01 (0.90)
OECD (Australia, New Zealand, Chile, Mexico, Israel) 465 658 3.08 (1.24) 5.01 (0.90)
OECD Total 33,789 20,286 3.06 (1.14) 4.76 (1.01)
Emerging Far East & Central Asia 1304 6337 4.76 (0.92) 4.36 (1.25)
Emerging Africa & Middle East 192 263 4.99 (0.71) 3.82 (1.12)
Emerging Eastern Europe 1831 25,872 4.96 (0.41) 3.52 (0.86)
Emerging South & Central America 1178 2479 4.78 (0.69) 3.47 (0.96)
Emerging countries Total 5060 33,339 4.88 (0.76) 3.82 (1.16)
Fig. 1. Change in institutional quality, 2002–2013.
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ment in equity markets but growing corruption. And ﬁnally,
Morocco, Cote d’Ivore, El Salvador, Trinidad and Tobago and Greece
experienced a deterioration in their equity markets and growing
corruption.
Notably, most developed countries are clustered in the centre of
the graph. They have experienced less institutional change; most of
the institutional dynamics have been amongst the emerging
market economies.
Table 2 provides a correlation matrix. Most of the correlations
between explanatory variables are weak and we conducted a series
of VIF calculations. All of these are below 2.5 and do not suggest
multicollinearity problems.5
3.1. Dependent variable
We observe the parent ﬁrm’s ownership percentage in its
afﬁliate for every year during the sample period. This percentage
ownership can stay constant year-on-year, can change upwards or
downwards, or be a sequence of the two during the period. Using
this detailed information we estimate a multinomial logit model,
where we categorise the discrete indicator of a change in foreign5 One exception are the correlations between home and host ﬁnancial
performance. Correlations are marginally signiﬁcant, but present no collinearity
problem due to the cross sectional variation in the measures.ownership control, as follows: (i) switches from majority to
minority ownership (ii) switches from minority to majority
ownership or (iii) no change between minority and majority.
While interpreting majority ownership as ownership control is a
simpliﬁcation, it is a reasonable one for most cases (see Bishop
et al., 2002; for further discussion). As an empirical extension and
robustness check we also create an alternative categorisation by
using the annual change in foreign ownership percentage to
distinguish between an increase, a decrease and no change.
3.2. Independent variables
There are two sets of variables that relate to our central
hypotheses, namely at the institutional and ﬁrm-level. Firstly, we
have the vector of the general institutional quality and of ﬁnancial
market measures, all in ﬁrst (annual) differences. These come as
two pairs, available for both the host and the home country.
However, our primary interest is in host country indicators
(hypotheses 1 and 2). We discuss these measures next.
3.2.1. Macro level: corruption and ease of accessing a local equity
market
In testing Hypothesis 1 we measure general institutional
quality using the level of corruption. In the IB literature, corruption
has been seen as the single most appropriate indicator of
institutional quality, as it distils the impact of underlying
institutional inputs (including the poor protection of property
rights and excessive or arbitrary regulation) into one output
indicator that describes the quality of the interface between
businesses and public administration (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006;
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016; Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; Javorcik & Wei,
2009; Tanzi, 1998; Zhao, Kim, & Du, 2003;). At the same time,
bribery may be seen as representing the normative aspect of
institutions (Estrin, Korosteleva, & Mickiewicz, 2013; Gaur and Lu,
2007).
We rely on data on freedom from corruption from the
International Risk Country Guide compiled by the Political Risk
Services Group (PRS), but the corruption index is consistent with
measures available either directly from Transparency International
or from Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal.6 Accordingly, we
include the corruption index (CI) for host and home countries
prepared by the PRS Group. The corruption index ranges from
1 = low level of corruption to 7 = high levels of corruption. This6 While these data capture the perceptions of business environment, the issue of
subjectivity is more apparent than real, since the business decisions are driven by
these same perceptions of the decision makers. The methodology used to combine
existing surveys into country-level scalars was developed by Transparency
International and is subsequently used by other public and private agencies that
report institutional indicators.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix.
Variable Mean Std dev 1 2 (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
1. Ownership share 75.60 31.53 1
2. Relatedness 0.22 0.41 0.02** 1
3. Maturity 0.55 0.50 0.07** 0.02** 1
4. International Experience 6.54 14.46 0.09** 0.01** 0.03** 1
5. Host country Experience 0.92 5.18 0.05** 0.02** 0.02** 0.53** 1
6. High tech dummy 0.34 0.47 0.07** 0.08** 0.02** 0.06** 0.02** 1
7. Host Corruption 0.01 0.23 0.05** 0.00 0.03** 0.02** 0.02** 0.01** 1
8. Host Equity markets 0.15 0.33 0.00 0.02** 0.01** 0.02** 0.02** 0.03** 0.09** 1
9. Home Corruption 0.02 0.36 0.01** 0.01** 0.03** 0.02** 0.01** 0.00 0.00 0.04** 1
10. Home Equity Markets 0.15 0.39 0.01** 0.01* 0.01** 0.01** 0.01* 0.01** 0.11** 0.52** 0.01** 1
11. Subsidiary Proﬁts dummy 0.38 0.48 0.09** 0.08** 0.07** 0.02** 0.03** 0.02** 0.08** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01 1
* p < 0.05; two-tailed test.
** p < 0.01; two-tailed test.
N. Drifﬁeld et al. / Journal of World Business 51 (2016) 965–976 971index offers an assessment of both political and ﬁnancial
corruption in, for example, the form of demands for special
payments, and bribes connected with import and export licenses,
exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loans. The
index also takes into account corruption in the form of excessive
patronage, nepotism, job reservations, “favour-for-favours”, secret
party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and
business.
In testing Hypothesis 2, we include an index measuring ease of
accessing a local equity market, taken from the Global Competi-
tiveness Report, prepared by World Economic Forum (WEF).
The WEF’s characterisation of country’s equity market is based
on the following question included in the survey of executives: “In
your country, how easy is it for companies to raise money by
issuing shares on the stock market? [1 = extremely difﬁcult;
7 = extremely easy]”. Both corruption and ease of ﬁnancial access
variables were centred on zero.
3.2.2. Firms’ level: maturity and relatedness
Our ﬁnal two hypotheses concern maturity of the project and
relatedness. Relatedness is captured by the similarity between the
parent’s core business and the nature of the foreign investment.
Speciﬁcally this concerns whether they are operating in the same
core (two-digit) industry.
Maturity is measured based on an afﬁliate’s founding year. As
the resulting age-of-ﬁrm variable has a highly skewed distribution
estimated mean effect would be meaningless: falling outside the
mass of actual observations. Therefore, we categorise this variable
into age of ﬁrms below 10 years versus 10 years and above, which
roughly corresponds to splitting observations by half.
3.2.3. Control variables
In addition, following the literature, we introduce a number of
control variables. On the macro level we add the corresponding
indicators (as described in Section 3.2.1) from the home country,
echoing the current state of the literature as represented by Lien
and Filatotchev (2015), who relate ownership shares held by
inward investors in more risky host countries to both the local
conditions and to the conditions faced by the parent ﬁrms at home.
Similarly, Brouthers (2002) and Lahiri, Elango, and Kundu (2014)
incorporate home in addition to host country effects.
Turning to the micro level, the arguments used to develop
Hypothesis 3 were related to project-speciﬁc (within-the-ﬁrm)
experience that accumulates with maturity. However, we wish to
check if the effects are not confounded by other types of
experience. We measure local experience (outside the ﬁrm) bythe number of subsidiaries in the same host country that the
foreign partner has, similar to Gaur and Lu (2007). In turn,
international experience is proxied by the number of subsidiaries in
other countries.
For relatedness, the key confounding effect may occur if in some
sectors it is more likely that foreign investors go for the same
sectoral afﬁliation when internationalising. We therefore need to
control for sectors of activity.
In addition, we include the existing ownership share. The
theoretical reason for doing this is that the drivers of ownership
change may be related to the pre-existing conditions based on the
literature discussed above. The initial ownership structure is likely
to capture all these factors well. A related empirical concern is that
with any adjustment process the initial condition is likely to be
important, based on optimum speed of adjustment considerations.
We control for past performance. Firms may wish to divest
themselves of shares in poorly performing afﬁliates or to increase
their share in highly proﬁtable afﬁliates. Although the local partner
may also seek to increase their holding in such circumstances; the
foreign (MNE) partner may have a liquidity advantage. Taking all of
these factors into consideration, past ﬁnancial performance is
likely to have some impact, but the net effect remains ambiguous.
We control for it by introducing a dummy which takes the value of
1 when returns on assets (ROA) are positive (lagged one year).
Finally, we need to isolate the effects of evolving world market
conditions by introducing time effects, as otherwise some
changes in the local institutional environments may be con-
founded with global trends. Likewise, the proﬁtability of
companies may have a shared global component and we need
to extract it. Furthermore, foreign investment decisions come in
waves affected by global market conditions. Parallel to this, since
we measure experience as ‘years since the afﬁliate was acquired’,
controlling for time is important, as otherwise our experience
measure could capture some cohort effects of these investment
waves.
3.3. The model
Our model incorporates variables that capture all of the effects
outlined above under Hypotheses 1–4. We relate changes in
ownership structure to changes in institutional quality and in
capital market effectiveness in the host (and home) countries, to
maturity of the project, and to whether the afﬁliate is characterised
by relatedness with respect to the activities of the parent. In
addition, we have additional controls as discussed above, so that
the impact of omitted variables bias is alleviated.
Table 3
Results of foreign afﬁliate ownership control changes (Multinomial logit regressions).
(1) Full sample (2) Without Wholly-owned (3) Without zeros (4) Europe only
VARIABLES Majority to
Minority
Minority to
Majority
Difference in
coef. (x2)
Majority to
Minority
Minority to
Majority
Majority to
Minority
Minority to
Majority
Majority to
Minority
Minority to
Majority
Ownership share (t-1) 0.006*** 0.069*** 0.009*** 0.053*** 0.004*** 0.071*** 0.007*** 0.072***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Relatedness with respect
to Parent
0.202*** 0.143** 18.800*** 0.089 0.093 0.201*** 0.083 0.232*** 0.231***
(0.050) (0.061) (0.061) (0.075) (0.051) (0.072) (0.066) (0.072)
Maturity: time since
initial Investment
0.266*** 0.065 12.590*** 0.193** 0.005 0.270*** 0.031 0.155*** 0.075
(0.069) (0.069) (0.094) (0.071) (0.070) (0.074) (0.059) (0.089)
International experience 0.012*** 0.018*** 0.012*** 0.021*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.019***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005)
Host country experience 0.015** 0.012 0.029*** 0.007 0.015* 0.00 0.006 0.005
(0.007) (0.025) (0.011) (0.019) (0.009) (0.019) (0.006) (0.039)
High tech dummy 0.611* 0.281 0.634 0.378 0.608 0.839 0.334 0.356
(0.364) (0.594) (0.555) (0.749) (0.399) (0.655) (0.449) (0.921)
Subsidiary Proﬁts 0.430*** 0.143*** 0.301*** 0.214*** 0.440*** 0.183*** 0.285*** 0.103
(0.051) (0.052) (0.053) (0.061) (0.051) (0.058) (0.056) (0.068)
Host Corruption 0.252** 0.017 2.340 0.125 0.003 0.226* 0.088 0.376*** 0.022
(0.120) (0.084) (0.135) (0.102) (0.120) (0.096) (0.120) (0.097)
Host Equity Market 0.255** 0.339*** 12.310*** 0.326** 0.292** 0.247* 0.242* 0.147 0.269**
(0.127) (0.111) (0.152) (0.120) (0.129) 0.133 (0.118) (0.121)
Home Corruption 0.357*** 0.323*** 0.161 0.198 0.336*** 0.235** 0.259* 0.339***
(0.104) (0.094) (0.131) (0.127) (0.106) (0.117) (0.140) (0.104)
Home Equity Market 0.358*** 0.228* 0.312** 0.234 0.362*** 0.033 0.117 0.170
(0.125) (0.118) (0.151) (0.168) (0.124) (0.151) (0.136) (0.132)
Constant 4.998*** 0.848*** 5.212*** 1.852*** 4.819*** 1.229*** 5.311*** 0.369
(0.178) (0.204) (0.218) (0.244) (0.179) (0.241) (0.199) (0.235)
Wald x2 24,123.46 10,373.22 20,042.28 35,452.61
Prob > x2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo-R2 0.215 0.122 0.163 0.256
Log-likelihood 25,193.699 15,557.725 22,481.975 16.412.075
Observations 105,993 56,744 101,749 83,721
Note: (1) The dependent variable in each model is the discrete choice of an annual ownership change between an increase, a decrease and no change in ownership share.
(2) The “No change” category is taken as the base group to which the estimates are compared with.
(3) Firm-level independent variables are lagged one period, and institutional variables are in ﬁrst differences and all speciﬁcations include a full set of afﬁliate’s sector and of
year dummies.
(4) Standard errors in parenthesis; *p <0.01; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
(5) The x2 statistic compares the log-likelihood of the model with that of a “base” model containing only two alternative-speciﬁc constants.
(6) In Model 1, for variables of interest we add results of the post-estimation test of equality of coefﬁcients, used to test our hypotheses.
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control that takes the following form:
yit ¼ xitb þ vit i ¼ 1; 2; :::; n and t ¼ 1; 2; ::; T
vit ¼ ait þ uit
yit ¼ 1 if yit > 0 and ¼ 0 otherwise
ð1Þ
where yit is a latent variable, the unobservable propensity for
ownership control change in either direction (i.e. towards majority
or towards minority), while y is the observed outcome. The latency
results from the fact that an investor may well wish to change the
control structure it has in the afﬁliate, but it requires willing buyers
or sellers and a functioning market for the event to occur. xit is the
matrix of time varying and time invariant variables which are
assumed exogenous with their inﬂuence on yit with all host and
home country level variables taken in ﬁrst differences, and ﬁrm-
level variables lagged to avoid simultaneity,7 bit is the vector of
parameters, ait is the individual unobservable effect and uit is the
random error. Given the multi-level data at our disposal, we allow
for industry-speciﬁc ﬁxed-effects (njh). Our measures of both
institutional quality and ﬁnancial market development enter the
model as changes in the values, such that we are relating the
change in ownership structure to the change in institutional
environments. We have 122 home countries and 125 host7 Equally, as we relate country level measures of institutional quality to ﬁrm level
ownership structure, there is no potential endogeneity in institutional quality.countries, and to avoid artiﬁcially boosting the signiﬁcance of
our country level effects we cluster standard errors on all home-
host country combinations present in our data. This is a
conservative approach to avoid over-stating the importance of
country level effects. As robustness checks we also run a version of
our models where standard errors are clustered on ﬁrms.
Predictably the results concerning the tests of our Hypotheses 1
and 2 increase markedly in signiﬁcance, while some of the
signiﬁcance on ﬁrm level variables become smaller. However, the
signiﬁcance and inferences concerning our various tests of
Hypotheses 3 and 4 remain unchanged (results available on
request).
As discussed, we model the process of change in ownership
control as three discrete outcomes: a shift towards majority
control by foreign investor, a shift towards minority control, and no
such change. While our baseline captures the discrete change
between minority and majority holding from the perspective of the
foreign ﬁrm, we also conduct a complementary but distinct
analysis based on changes in ownership shares. The justiﬁcation of
this approach is as follows. While the stress on ownership control
ﬁts our theoretical perspective best, it is possible for there to be
sizeable changes in ownership structure that do not change the
category; for example, changing the ownership of an afﬁliate from
90% to 60% still requires signiﬁcant investment from a local
partner, but would not be captured within the discrete category.
This becomes important in terms of the application of property
rights in the context of local institutional environments. An
increase in local holding of this magnitude involves potentially the
Table 4
Additional results: foreign afﬁliate ownership percentage changes (Multinomial logit regressions).
(1) Full sample (2) Without Wholly-owned (3) Without zeros (4) Europe only
VARIABLES Decrease
share
Increase
share
Decrease
share
Increase
share
Decrease
share
Increase
share
Decrease
share
Increase share
Ownership share (t-1) 0.007*** 0.020*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.012*** 0.005*** 0.022***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Relatedness with respect to Parent 0.231*** 0.130*** 0.109*** 0.035 0.236*** 0.155*** 0.214*** 0.086**
(0.034) (0.034) (0.040) (0.045) (0.035) (0.036) (0.042) (0.036)
Maturity: time since initial
investment
0.331*** 0.179*** 0.307*** 0.216*** 0.330*** 0.203*** 0.384*** 0.329***
(0.045) (0.040) (0.060) (0.045) (0.045) (0.042) (0.050) (0.040)
International experience 0.004*** 0.011*** 0.005*** 0.010*** 0.004** 0.009*** 0.004*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Host country experience 0.006 0.000 0.003 0.006 0.007* 0.002 0.008** 0.003
(0.005) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.010) (0.003) (0.009)
High tech dummy 0.293 0.006 0.305 0.124 0.322 0.107 0.051 0.160
(0.206) (0.227) (0.324) (0.321) (0.212) (0.215) (0.224) (0.262)
Subsidiary Proﬁts 0.552*** 0.507*** 0.296*** 0.328*** 0.566*** 0.543*** 0.469*** 0.443***
(0.045) (0.049) (0.041) (0.049) (0.045) (0.052) (0.051) (0.060)
Host Corruption 0.331*** 0.145* 0.127 0.034 0.315*** 0.131 0.468*** 0.193**
(0.085) (0.077) (0.090) (0.084) (0.086) (0.081) (0.104) (0.096)
Host Equity Market 0.044 0.091 0.072 0.141 0.048 0.046 0.016 0.027
(0.076) (0.081) (0.092) (0.091) (0.076) (0.088) (0.082) (0.087)
Home Corruption 0.059 0.229*** 0.0760 0.241*** 0.048 0.207*** 0.024 0.218***
(0.078) (0.058) (0.087) (0.067) (0.078) (0.060) (0.090) (0.064)
Home Equity Market 0.068 0.078 0.113 0.172** 0.073 0.037 0.144* 0.066
(0.078) (0.064) (0.086) (0.073) (0.077) (0.066) (0.087) (0.069)
Constant 3.416*** 1.149*** 3.506*** 1.792*** 3.231*** 1.257*** 3.263*** 0.909***
(0.132) (0.117) (0.136) (0.138) (0.135) (0.122) (0.158) (0.126)
Wald x2 12412.94 6,321.67 10,870.58 19,222
Prob > x2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo-R2 0.107 0.085 0.101 0.117
Log-likelihood 71,053.193 39,651.525 67,832.215 55,599.105
Observations 105,993 56,744 101,749 83,721
Note: (1) The dependent variable in each model is the discrete choice of an annual ownership change between an increase, a decrease and no change in ownership share.
(2) The “No change” category is taken as the base group to which the estimates are compared with.
(3) Firm-level independent variables are lagged one period, and institutional variables are in ﬁrst differences and all speciﬁcations include a full set of afﬁliate’s sector and of
year dummies.
(4) Standard errors in parenthesis; *p <0.01; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
(5) The x2 statistic compares the log-likelihood of the model with that of a “base” model containing only two alternative-speciﬁc constants.
(6) In Model 1, for variables of interest we add results of the post-estimation test of equality of coefﬁcients, used to test our hypotheses.
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but it may reﬂect the availability of local capital, or the need to
further incentivise local partners. We therefore augment our initial
analysis by estimating a model where outcomes are deﬁned by an
increase, no change and decrease in ownership share of foreign
investor. In both cases we estimate a multinomial logit model,
which considers the effects of ﬁrm characteristics on the
probability of each of the choices.8
4. Results
We estimate four variants of equation 1 presented above and
the results are in Tables 3 and 4. Model 1 is estimated on the full
sample. We perform a number of additional checks in Models 2–4.8 The multinomial logit model is a special case of the general logit model that
allows for more than two outcomes. After estimating the parameters of the model,
one can then predict the probability that an individual with a certain vector of
characteristics will choose a certain outcome. An alternative strategy could be to
model ownership change as a continuous dependent variable. However, the nature
of the data renders that impossible. A large number of zero changes implies non-
normality, such that even if we did model the process as a continuous variable with
lots of zeros, the results would not be credible.In Model 2 we exclude wholly-owned afﬁliates.9 In Model 3 we
exclude afﬁliates whose ownership falls to zero. Model 4 is
restricted to Europe in order to investigate whether the results are
affected by geography.
In order to evaluate the overall performance of our modelling
and estimation strategy, we employ Wald tests to verify that we
can reject the null hypothesis that the alternative choices in our
dependent variable should be combined. This indeed cannot be
rejected at the 0.001 signiﬁcance level (Long & Freese, 2014).
Empirical support for our hypotheses is then based on the
signiﬁcance of the relevant coefﬁcients for Hypotheses 1 and 2,
and on post-estimation tests of differences in coefﬁcients between
the outcomes, evaluated for the variables of interest for Hypothe-
ses 3 and 4 (all for the core Model 1).
Our results show clearly that we have support for all of our
hypotheses based on property rights theory. In Hypothesis 1, we
test two arguments contrasting property rights theory and
transactions costs – agency theories. We ﬁnd that an increase in
host country corruption is strongly associated with a lower9 In the paper we consistently use the term “majority ownership”, to simplify our
terminology. However, where we include wholly owned majority ownership, the
term “dominant ownership” as used by Gaur and Lu (2007) could probably ﬁt better.
An important point here is that shifts between wholly-owned structures and
(simple) majority are common. That distinction is not clear-cut: a local peak in
distribution of ownership is instead just above the 50% ownership threshold,
conﬁrming the signiﬁcance of the property rights/ownership control perspective.
Drifﬁeld et al. (2014) offer further discussion of the shape of the distribution in
ownership.
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with Hypothesis 1b, but not 1a. This suggests that the increased
risk of expropriation argument trumps the increased opacity
argument, subject to proper restraint with which we should
interpret any empirical results. In contrast, there is no effect of
corruption on the likelihood of a move to majority holding.
Hypothesis 2 is strongly supported in that improvements in
local equity markets make the shift towards foreign minority
ownership more likely, compared with the shift towards majority
ownership. Here our key argument has been that the relative
importance of the foreign contribution decreases, and what we
obtained is consistent with this.
The results from the estimation of the supplementary model
(based on a change in ownership share) in contrast with the core
model (change in majority-minority status) are informative here.
The signs on the coefﬁcient are consistent with the baseline
(ownership category) model, but the signiﬁcance reduces. We infer
two things from this. Firstly, formal changes in majority-minority
ownership control are a more meaningful feature of ownership
changes than are mere changes in ownership within the category.
Secondly, this ﬁnding conﬁrms the property rights perspective to
be the appropriate framework since this is linked to ownership
control (decision rights) rather than to merely identifying the
ﬁrms’ relative rights to a future income stream.
Table 3, illustrates strong support for Hypothesis 3b (i.e. the
alternative based on property rights theory) and Hypothesis 4:
Increased experience makes adjustment towards minority foreign
control more likely; and relatedness between the afﬁliate’s and the
parent’s activities renders adjustment towards minority shares
less likely and adjustment towards majority shares more likely.
Model 4 shows the results of isolating Europe from our sample.
This conﬁrms that our overall ﬁndings are robust to the distinction
between within-continent linkages between MNEs and their
afﬁliates, compared with linkages between MNEs and afﬁliates
located in different continents. The rationale for undertaking the
analysis for Europe is that it constitutes the largest part of our data.
In order to illustrate the relative magnitude of the effects, we
combine the results for the four institutional variables (from Model
1) into one graph presented below as Fig. 2, which adopts a method
developed by Long and Freese (2014) to visualise the multinomial
model results in a concise way.
Here, the effects of the independent variables are represented
in separate rows. The magnitude and sign of each of these is
measured on the horizontal axis. The letters on the graphs indicate
different outcomes of the dependent variable included in the
multinomial model so that: D relates to a decrease in ownership
share of the foreign parent company in its afﬁliate; I to an increase;
and 0 to an outcome where there is no ownership change. There
are two measures of the size and sign of the effects. The horizontal
scale above the graph corresponds to the relative odds ratios for
each of these outcomes, such that 1 on the horizontal axis
represents a situation where a particular variable has no effect. An
odds ratio below 1 implies a negative impact, and an odds ratio
above 1 implies a positive impact. The distance from 1 can be taken
as a measure of the strength of the effect, so for example the impact
of one standard deviation increase in host country equity market
effectiveness has twice as strong an effect as a similar magnitude
decrease in the host country corruption indicator. The scale at the
bottom of the graph represents the logit coefﬁcients. Here, a
coefﬁcient value of 0 corresponds to the odds ratio of 1 on the
upper scale.
The ﬁrst row corresponds to host country corruption. Deterio-
ration in the host country institutional quality (increase in
corruption) has an ambiguous effect on the likelihood of a shift
toward majority foreign control. In contrast, it has a strong effect
on the likelihood of shifting the majority control to local partners.This ﬁgure also demonstrates elegantly the comparative effects
of home country changes. While a detailed discussion of these is
beyond the scope of this paper, it is interesting to note that a
change in home country corruption has an impact on ownership
control shifts that is directionally opposite to that of host country
corruption.
Hypothesis 2 suggests that an improvement in the host
country’s equity market quality will make a reduction in the
share of foreign ownership more likely. This is supported. As
illustrated by the second row of Fig. 2, the likelihood of increase
towards majority share comes with large, negative coefﬁcient (odd
ratio below one). In contrast, the likelihood of decrease towards
minority share comes with positive coefﬁcient (odd ratio above
one).
With respect to the home country equity market, we also ﬁnd
both coefﬁcients signiﬁcant. What is interesting to note is that the
effect of the improved quality of the home country equity market is
very strong on the likelihood of a decrease in foreign shareholding;
it is the strongest effect of all that we found for institutional
variables.
5. Conclusions
This paper explains a long standing disconnect in the literature
concerning macro level institutional voids deterring FDI and
locations with signiﬁcant voids still attracting signiﬁcant amounts
of FDI. To resolve this issue we adopt a perspective, which enables
us to analyse both the institutional environment and ﬁrm level
characteristics as part of the integrated framework. The key
question relates to the value of the relative contribution of the
partners and to the outside options they possess. We examine the
evolution of ownership structure of foreign afﬁliates in the context
of institutional voids, both in terms of the standard measure of
institutional quality, and also in terms of equity market develop-
ment. Firm level factors we consider are relatedness and maturity
of the JV. We argue that the ownership control structure adjusts,
because changes in both the environment and in partners’
characteristics imply changes in the value of their contribution:
the response, in the form of a change in the afﬁliate’s ownership
structure, is conditioned both by the value of the relative
contributions of foreign and local partners and by their outside
options (De Meza & Lockwood, 1998).
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Hennart and Slangen (2014), who emphasise the need for greater
understanding of the post-entry ownership evolution. We argue
that the desired level of a foreign ﬁrm’s commitment to a host
country or to a project may change over time. Indeed, the Uppsala
framework by Johanson and Vahlne (1977, 2009) emphasises
experiential learning and the evolutionary aspects of the process of
adjustment. Though we adopt a different framework, we contrib-
ute to the same discussion while predicting different outcomes
(especially in Hypothesis 3b as contrasted with 3a).
This study is a ﬁrst preliminary step into the direction of
building a richer theory, linking changes in institutional voids to
evolution in MNE ownership structure. This is needed as both the
wider institutional system and the ﬁnancial sub-system aspects of
institutional quality impact on these strategies. In this paper we
take the existing ownership structure as a boundary control
condition, and – to the best of our knowledge – make the ﬁrst step
towards building a theory that focuses on adjustment processes in
ownership control, demonstrating the importance of both ﬁrm
level and institutional characteristics under a consistent frame-
work of the property rights approach. We stress that ownership
control should belong to those whose behaviour most affects the
value of the venture on the margin, and to those who are more
sensitive to the outside options (De Meza & Lockwood, 1998).
Our ﬁndings suggest a number of directions for further work.
Firstly, the precise nature of the adjustment process in ownership
needs to be explored further by bridging the IB, economics, and
ﬁnance literatures to highlight the importance of control and
governance structures for ﬁrm performance. For example, the level
of dynamic capabilities (Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005; Prange &
Verdier, 2011; Rugman & Verbeke, 2001), the nature of the
embededness of afﬁliates (Kafouros, Buckley, & Clegg, 2012; Meyer
et al., 2011; Nobel & Birkinshaw, 1998), and the organisational
learning within the MNE network (Andersson, Björkman, &
Forsgren, 2005; Mudambi, 2002; Oddou, Osland, & Blakeney,
2009) may inform us on the additional drivers of post-entry
behaviour and their relative importance vis-à-vis evolving
institutional quality. Taken together, our ﬁndings also post some
interesting challenges for the literature which seeks to build on
Chang, Chung, and Moon (2013) comparing the respective
performance of ventures with different ownership structure. We
highlight that comparing JVs with wholly owned afﬁliates, merely
provides a picture at a point in time, rather than an indication of
the optimal evolution of a given ownership structure. The
challenge is to link this evolution of ownership structure to
subsequent performance. This in turn offers a number of insights
for managers of MNEs. As host country equity markets improve,
local ﬁrms are better able to use them, which erodes the MNE’s
inherent advantage in terms of access to ﬁnance. In order to sustain
a competitive advantage, it is important for MNEs to continue to
support subsidiary development, and encourage multiple
embeddedness of its afﬁliates as host countries develop.
As ﬁnancial markets improve, they can also provide important
feedback to the MNE in terms of reliable signals and responses to
investment decisions. This reduces the need for control in the form
of high ownership levels, and makes a decrease in the ownership
share of foreign partners more likely; this effect runs in parallel to
the improvement in the broader institutional environment.
Interestingly, as illustrated by Fig. 2, in terms of relative magnitude
of the effects, the quality of the host equity markets we stress here
dominates over the general institutional quality of the host
country, albeit both remain important. This however presents a
challenge for the multinational, in terms of encouraging further
development of its afﬁliates, in the form of both organic growth,
but also via providing further, and possibly different, resourcesfrom the parent company, while resolving the question if reducing
ownership stakes will be optimal.
Presence of such ambiguities and dilemmas, in a wider context,
highlight the contribution that property rights analysis can make
to IB theory. We demonstrated, while motivating and testing our
hypotheses, that the property rights theory leads to sharper
predictions than some alternative theories.
Our analysis also highlights the need for a better understanding
of the relative importance of public policy and private investment
in improving both institutional quality and ﬁrm performance in
emerging markets. Work is also needed to further link our ﬁndings
to the empirical literature on international technology transfer and
spillovers. It is reasonable to assume that technology transfer from
parent to afﬁliate increases with the size of the parental
investment. This cannot therefore be divorced from the evolution
of ownership structures, either in terms of the theoretical
treatments of technology transfer, but also in the capacity for
developing countries to attract foreign investment in order to
connect to global technology and improve competitiveness. We
hope that some of these issues are explored further in order to
understand the complex nature of the adjustment process in
ownership.
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